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Bastardy Proceedings-A Proposal
Harry W. Greenfield*
64M,(ATERNITY, a British writer once said, is a matter of fact, pater-
I iLnity is a matter of opinion." 1 In 1966 the estimated number of
illegitimate births in the United States was 302,600 or 23.6% of all
births.2 This influx of illegitimate children has caused an increase in
the number of bastardy complaints. In 1967 the Juvenile Court of Cuya-
hoga County (Metropolitan Cleveland), Ohio, received 849 bastardy
complaints. 3 This figure increased to 877 in 1968.4 The problems to
the community of illegitimacy are manifested on the court dockets, the
welfare rolls, and in the adoption agencies. Mother and father alike
suffer during the pendency of a paternity suit.
Over the years the courts have attempted to solve this growing
problem by diverse methods. Most courts have taken the position that
while they have an "inherent empathy" with the parents, their major
concern is the child. 5 Other courts feel that the statutory remedy pre-
vents placing a burden on the public which ought to rest upon the
father."
Sydney B. Schatkin, an active city attorney, estimates that in twenty-
three years of practice he has handled 5000 bastardy cases, winning about
3700 convictions. Of this number Mr. Schatkin feels that at least 750
of these men were not the fathers of the children involved.7 Are the
ostensibly faulty convictions of these men a matter of improper pro-
cedure, or does the fault lie elsewhere?
* B.B.A., Ohio Univ.; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University; law clerk for Gardner, Spilka, and Weltman, of Cleve-
land.
1 Pett, "Court Suits in Paternity Favor Women," New Haven Register, October 29,
1951, reprinted in Harper, Problems of the Family 43 (2d ed 1962).
2 U.S. Department of Commerce, 1968 Statistical Abstract of the United States 51.
Includes estimates for states in which legitimacy data was not reported. No estimates
included for misstatements on birth records or failure to register births. Rate per
thousand unmarried (never married, widowed, and divorced) women aged 15 to 44
years estimated as of July 1, 1966.
3 1967 Annual Report of The Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio)
27.
4 1968 Annual Report of The Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio)
27.
5 District of Columbia v. Turner, 154 A. 2d 925 (D.C. App., 1959).
6 Perkins v. Mobley, 4 Ohio St. 668 (1855).
7 Pett, supra n. 1. Sydney Schatkin, for twenty-three years preceding the newspaper
article, was an Assistant Corporation counsel of New York City. One of his assigned
tasks was to prosecute bastardy complaints.
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Civil or Criminal?
Bastardy proceedings have been categorized as criminal,8 civil,9
or quasi-criminal."" The classification of the action varies with the juris-
diction. The controversy stems from the unusual combination of crim-
inal and civil aspects of the action. For example in Ohio to institute a
bastardy action, an unmarried woman" must swear out a complaint in
a county or juvenile court.12 A warrant for the arrest of the putative
father is then issued, and any sheriff, police officer, or constable of that
county is dispatched to place the defendant in custody.13 The defendant
is then brought before a judge to answer the complaint. 14
After its inception, with criminal characteristics, a bastardy action
assumes a civil nature at the time of trial. The complainant's testimony
does not have to be corroborated by other witnesses. 15 The defendant
may not only be called for cross-examination, 16 but also is prohibited
from providing character witnesses unless his testimony is impeached.' 7
A verdict of guilty may be rendered on a preponderance of the evi-
dence'8 by a vote of fewer than twelve jurors.19 After an unfavorable
ruling20 a complainant may appeal without placing the defendant in
double jeopardy if a new trial is ordered.21 Furthermore, a contempt
charge stemming from non-payment of ordered maintenance payments
8 State v. Brewer, 38 S.C. 263, 16 S.E. 1001 (1893); Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 122
A. 2d 674 (1959).
9 State ex rel. Gresham v. Wright, 140 Kan. 679, 38 P. 2d 135 (1934); Kline v. State
ex rel. St. Clair, 20 Ohio App. 191, 151 N.E. 802 (1925); Bielowski v. Burke, 121 Vt.
62, 147 A. 2d 674 (1959).
10 State ex rel. Rarick v. Baughman, 4 Ohio App. 251 (1915); Perkins v. Mobley,
supra n. 6.
11 Ohio Rev. Code, § 3111.01; Beam v. Ray, 111 Ohio App. 341, 170 N.E. 2d 844 (1960);
Kirkbride v. Eshbaugh, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 147 N.E. 2d 676 (1957); Yuin v. Hilton,
16 Ohio St. 164, 134 N.E. 2d 719 (1956); State ex rel. Hoerres v. Wilkoff, 157 Ohio St.
286, 105 N.E. 2d 39 (1952).
12 Ohio Rev. Code, § 3111.01.
13 Ibid.; and Ohio Rev. Code, § 3111.19.
14 Ohio Rev. Code, § 3111.01.
15 Pratt v. Brickey, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 19 (1928); Snyder v. State, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 1
(1932).
16 State ex rel. Simmons v. Kiser, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 113, 98 N.E. 2d 322 (1950); State
ex rel. Hetzler v. Snyder, 63 Ohio L. Abs. 42, 109 N.E. 2d 54 (1950); contra State ex
rel. Steiger v. Gray, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 393, 145 N.E. 2d 162 (1957).
17 Kline v. State ex rel. Simmons, supra n. 9.
18 Reams v. State ex rel. Favors, 53 Ohio App. 19, 4 N.E. 2d 151 (1936); Pratt v.
Brickey, supra n. 15; State ex rel. Gauvey v. Lofton, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 415 (1932).
19 Durst v. Griffith, 43 Ohio App. 44, 182 N.E. 519 (1932); Reams v. State ex rel.
Favors, supra n. 18; Schneider v. State ex rel. Shor, 33 Ohio App. 125, 168 N.E. 568
(1929). In Ohio a vote of three quarters of the jury is sufficient for a conviction.
20 Schneider v. State ex rel. Shorf, supra n. 19.
21 State ex rel. Gill v. Volz, 156 Ohio St. 60, 100 N.E. 2d 203 (1951).
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is a civil contempt proceeding. 22 In 1871, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that a bastardy action is in the nature of a police regulation with an
objective of furnishing maintenance for the child and indemnity to the
public for the child's support.23 Thus the primary objective of a bas-
tardy action as defined by that court is to grant financial redress to the
mother of the child.
"The difference between civil and criminal law turns on the differ-
ence between two objects which the law seeks to pursue-redress or
punishment." 24 Since the primary function of a bastardy proceeding
being redress it is apparent that these suits are basically civil in nature.
But there is more to this particular action than simple redress of griev-
ances. There is also the problem of a man being arrested, incarcerated,
and brought before a judge to answer a complaint-all without the con-
stitutional protections granted in a criminal case.
In In re Gault, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that
criminal constitutional protections extend beyond the arbitrary distinc-
tions of civil and criminal procedure, and should extend to all proceed-
ings which may result in commitment. "It is incarceration against one's
will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.' " 25 Even though the court
was ruling on a juvenile conviction, the decision in Gault should alter
bastardy proceedings. Both juvenile actions and bastardy actions are
considered quasi-criminal in many jurisdictions.
The Gault decision further complicates the already confused area of
bastardy, but, as yet, no State courts have ruled whether the Gault case
will apply to bastardy actions. The question remains open. Tradition-
ally the courts have held almost unanimously that a bastardy proceeding
is civil in nature. 26 However, the problem is not totally resolved. An
Ohio court in Schneider v. State ex rel. Shorf, held that "in many re-
spects it [bastardy] is more criminal than civil." 27 Other states have had
some difficulty in obtaining a uniformity of ruling.28
22 State ex rel. Merrill v. Moore, 83 Ohio App. 525, 82 N.E. 2d 323 (1948).
23 Musser v. Stewart, 21 Ohio St. 353 (1871).
24 Geldart, Elements of English Law, 8-9 (1911).
25 387 U.S. 1, 50, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 558 (1966).
26 Duncan v. State ex rel. Williams, 119 Ohio St. 453, 164 N.E. 527 (1928); Crawford
v. Hasberry, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 205, 186 N.E. 2d 522 (1962); Reams v. State ex rel.Favors, supra n. 18; Taylor v. Scott, 168 Ohio St. 391, 155 N.E. 2d 884 (1957); Kline
v. State ex rel. St. Clair, supra n. 9; See also State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 P. 375(1903); State v. Longwell, 135 Minn. 65, 160 N.W. 189 (1916).
27 Supra n. 19.
28 People v. Bowers, 9 Misc. 2d 873, 170 N.Y.S. 2d 546 (1958); Anonymous v. Anony-
mous, 13 Misc. 2d 718, 180 N.Y.S. 2d 183 (1958); Matter of Clausi, 296 N.Y. 354, 73N.E. 2d 548 (1947). As recently as 1958 the New York courts were confused as to
which procedure should be used. At that time some of the courts in New York de-
cided that the proceeding was civil, while the courts in New York City held that theproceeding was criminal.
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The criminal nature of a bastardy action extends beyond the trial.
Even though the proceeding is considered civil, a convicted defendant
may be jailed for contempt of court if he fails to make his maintenance
payments.29 Hence there is another anomaly in the ostensibly civil nature
of a bastardy proceeding. Article I, Section 15 of the Ohio Constitution
reads, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action, or
mesne, or final process, unless in case of fraud." 30 An explanation is
that, like alimony, maintenance payments are not debts in the constitu-
tional sense, but moral obligations. 31 The defendant is free to choose
between incarceration or compliance with the order.32 Nevertheless, the
defendant is being incarcerated against his will in the event of non-
compliance.
State ex rel. Chand v. Wise
A look at a particular case may reveal the equities and inequities
of the present system. In State ex rel. Chand v. Wise,33 plaintiff's attor-
ney used the present procedure to its fullest benefit. On May 12, 1967,
plaintiff registered her complaint in the Juvenile Court of Summit
County, Ohio. The case came to trial before a jury on March 11, 1968.
For her first witness, the prosecutrix called the defendant. Under the
rules of civil procedure of Ohio calling a defendant for cross-examination
is proper,34 but under the rules of criminal procedure it is a violation of
both the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
35
Over his counsel's objection, defendant was placed on the witness
stand. Not only was he asked about his relationship with the plaintiff,
but also was asked about his relationship with plaintiff's family and
friends. Defendant admitted having intercourse with the plaintiff, but
denied having seen her, her family, or her friends during the possible
29 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2705.02; Catrow v. Columbus, Delaware, and Marion Railway
Co., 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 561, 22 Ohio Dec. 79 (1911); State ex rel. Maple v. Hamilton,
19 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 229, 27 Ohio C. Dec. 147 (1912); State ex rel. Merrill v. Moore,
supra n. 22.
30 See also Calif., Const. Art. 1, § 15; Fla. Const., Decl. of Rights, § 17; Ill. Const.,
Art. 2, § 12; Mich. Const., Art. 1, § 21.
31 Kirkbridge v. Eschbaugh, supra n. 11, Acker v. Adamson, 67 S. Dak. 341, 293 N.W.
83 (1940).
32 In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448 (8th Cir., 1902).
33 Ohio Supreme Court, No. 69-175. This case is currently before the Ohio Supreme
Court.
34 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2317.07. "At the instance of the adverse party, a party may be
examined as if under cross-examination, orally, by way of deposition, like any other
witness, by way of written interrogatories filed in the action or proceeding pertinent
to previous pleadings of such party, or by any one or more of such methods."
35 U.S. Const., Amend. V; Ohio Const., Art. I, Sec. 10; Ohio Rev. Code, § 2945.43.
"On the trial of a criminal cause, a person charged with an offense may, at his own
request, be a witness, but not otherwise .... "
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interim of conception. Defendant's attorney should have objected to the
question concerning the sexual relations of the two parties, 36 but an
objection to the question concerning plaintiff's family and friends would
not have been sustained. 37 He could have claimed his rights against self-
incrimination since defendant conceivably could be found guilty of some
crime dealing with moral turpitude and thus would be incriminating
himself. However, to claim that all the answers to the proposed ques-
tions would be self-incriminating would not be valid. One cannot capri-
ciously refuse to answer a question unless he has reason to believe that
his testimony could possibly expose him to punishment .3
After prosecuting counsel had questioned the defendant, she pro-
duced five witnesses for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the
defendant. Again, this would not have happened under criminal pro-
cedure as the defendant would not have been forced to take the stand.
During the presentation of plaintiff's case, not one witness was called to
corroborate the plaintiff's testimony.
The jury, after hearing the evidence, returned a 9 to 3 decision-
enough to sustain a civil decision,39 but not the required number for a
criminal conviction.40
In summary, a man was forced to reveal his entire case. The plain-
tiff was permitted to impeach his testimony and to have uncorroborated
testimony. Despite these disadvantages, the defendant convinced three
jurors that he was innocent.
Proposal
Since the landmark case of Escobedo v. Illinois,41 the United States
Supreme Court has been the watchdog of an accused criminal's consti-
tutional rights. The court in In re Gault held that regardless of the pro-
cedure, if the posture of defendant's case is such that the possibility of
incarceration exists, he should be afforded the protection of his consti-
tutional safeguards. 42 Since the Gault ruling the court has had occasion
to apply this ruling to non-juvenile cases. In In re Ruffalo, the court
examined the nature of a disbarment proceeding. The defendant had
several charges to answer, but not until he had given sufficient testimony
36 Taylor v. Mosley, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 335, 178 N.E. 2d 55 (1961).
37 Ibid.
38 Id. "The privilege [against self-incrimination] must be limited to instances where
there is reasonable cause for the witness to apprehend danger that his testimony
would possibly expose him to punishment in the courts." [at p. 343, 60]
39 Ohio Const., Art. I, Sec. 5; Ohio Rev. Code, § 2315.09; Schneider v. State ex rel.
Shorf, supra n. 19; Durst v. Griffith, supra n. 19; Reams v. State ex rel. Favors,
supra n. 18.
40 Ohio Const., Art. I, Sec. 5.
41 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
42 In re Gault, supra n. 25.
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to sustain a different charge were the charges amended. The court held
that he could not be disbarred since he did not know the charges when
he was giving his original testimony.43 A putative father is under a
similar handicap. He is called on cross-examination to testify, and after
he has given his testimony he can be charged with adultery or forni-
cation.
44
There have been several suggested changes that would place the
defendant under the protection of the Constitution. One of these sug-
gestions is to separate the civil aspects of a bastardy action from the
criminal, and apply the appropriate rules of procedure in each. 45 An-
other suggestion is to use criminal procedure only where the proceed-
ings are appropriate to the father alone and not the child.46 Still another
suggestion is to use criminal procedure only.4
7
The protection of one's constitutional rights should be founded on
a sturdier base than merely a distinction between civil and criminal
procedure. The overwhelming difference between a debt and support
payments underscores this point. A judgment on a debt may be effec-
tive for five years48 with the right to revive.49 A maintenance order is
valid until the child reaches the age of 18.50 Judgments may be dis-
charged in bankruptcy, 51 but this is not so with maintenance payments. 52
One may not be imprisoned for failure to pay his debts,5 3 but the Ohio
code makes it a crime for one chargeable with maintenance to fail to
support an illegitimate child under 18 years of age.5 4
Despite the possibilities of such harsh punishment a defendant is
tried under the rules of civil and not criminal procedure. The provisions
of the act or the judicial interpretations should be altered to give a de-
fendant in a bastardy case his constitutional privileges of a criminal
43 In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968).
44 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2905.08.
45 Wysong, The Jurisprudence of Labels, 39 Neb. L. Rev. 671 (1960).
46 District of Columbia v. Turner, supra n. 5, at 926.
47 The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 Col. L. Rev. 1333; Lank v. State, 219
Md. 433, 149 A. 2d 367 (1959); Kisner v. State, supra n. 8.
48 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2329.07.
49 Ibid. § 2325.15.
50 Id. § 3113.99.
51 Bankruptcy Act, § 14, U.S.C.; Title 11, Chap. 3, § 32; 1 Collier on Bankruptcy 1241,
1628 (14th ed. with current suppl.); Bankruptcy Act, § 17; 14 U.S.C. Title 11, Chap. 3,
§ 35. Except those debts which are incurred by false pretenses, or by willful and
malicious injury.
52 Bankruptcy Act, § 17, 14 U.S.C. Title 11, Chap. 3, Sec. 35; 1 Collier on Bankruptcy
1668 (14th ed., with current suppl.).
53 Ohio Const., Art. I, § 15.
54 Ohio Rev. Code, § 3113.99.
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action. 55 Those bastardy actions in which the defendant may be im-
prisoned should be governed by criminal procedure, e.g., cases where
maintenance payments are prayed for by the plaintiff. As this form of
bastardy action has many characteristics of a criminal action,5 6 it would
seem apparent that it is necessary to employ criminal procedure. This
will not encompass all bastardy complaints, however, since the child is
placed with an adoption agency in many instances and the only damages
are the medical expenses of childbirth, loss of plaintiff's wages, etc.
These cases should be governed by civil procedure, as this form of bas-
tardy action resembles an action for debt.
Conclusion
The putative father's rights are in need of protection. It is true that
many a defendant is indeed the father of the child; however, the rights
of the defendant, be he guilty or innocent, must be upheld. The father
may face jail anytime he cannot adequately explain to the court why he
had not been making his support payments. 57
Over the years the courts have allowed civil procedure to govern
quasi-criminal cases in this area of law. The courts have rationalized
their position by emphasizing that the purpose of a bastardy action is
solely financial redress. There is a need for the courts to break from
their traditional holding and balance the protection of the mother, child,
and state with the rights of the father.
55 Schneider v. State ex rel. Shorf, supra n. 19. There it was held that it is contrary
to the constitutional right of the defendant to require him to give testimony against
himself. For views in other jurisdictions, see N.Y.C. Criminal Courts Act, 864, Sub-
division 3, "A paternity proceeding is not a civil action governed by the Civil Prac-
tice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure . K." Eisner v. State, supra n. 8; State ex rel.
Steiger v. Gray, supra n. 16.
56 State (F) v. M, 95 N.J. Super. 335, 233 A. 2d 65 (1967).
57 Ohio Rev. Code, § 3113.02. "Upon the trial for any offense, defined in section
3113.01 of the Revised Code, the defendant shall be acquitted if it appears that he
was, because of, lack of property or earnings, inability to secure employment, or
physical incapacity to perform labor, unable to provide the minor or handicapped
child or pregnant woman with the necessary or proper home, food, and clothing."
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